Gray marketing, the selling of branded goods outside of manufacturer-authorized channels, is a factor in many industries. Using a model of di¤erentiated Cournot competition, we analyze how gray markets a¤ect the strategy used to enter low-priced foreign markets. In particular, we examine how much autonomy a …rm should give its foreign subsidiary. When production in the foreign country is determined at head o¢ ce, the …rm has a centralized organizational structure. In contrast, when the subsidiary has autonomy to set its own production, the …rm has a decentralized organizational structure. In the presence of gray markets, we …nd that organizational structure has a signi…cant e¤ect on …rm pro…tability. When competing products in the domestic market are highly substitutable, foreign entry accompanied by decentralized management is advantageous.
Introduction

Background
Gray marketing, also known as diversion or parallel importing, is the selling of genuine branded goods outside of manufacturer-authorized channels. Whenever genuine branded goods are available for sale at di¤erent prices in di¤erent markets or channels, the potential for gray marketing exists. 1 Manufacturers in high-priced markets like the US often encounter signi…cant quantities of gray market goods that have been imported to the US from markets where price levels are lower. In a recent high-pro…le example, Costco purchased genuine Omega watches overseas for substantially less than Omega's US retail price, and then sold these watches in competition with Omega's authorized channel. 2 Gray marketing a¤ects a wide range of categories: common examples include clothing, IT products, luxury goods, portable phones, soft drinks and pharmaceutical products. While the importance of gray marketing varies by category, the impact is large. A 2009 analysis by Deloitte LLP estimates that gray market sales cost manufacturers collectively as much as $63 billion in annual sales. 3 The Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit Abatement estimated in 2008 that the value of gray market products in the information technology (IT) sector alone was $58 billion (8% of global sales) annually, representing lost pro…ts of up to $10 billion. 4 Gray market sales of pharmaceuticals in the European Union are estimated to comprise nearly 20% of the UK market and 10% or more of the Dutch, Danish and Swedish markets, while gray market "exports" (out ‡ow) represented 22% of the Greek market (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005) . In the cell phone industry, Fortune reported that in 2007 as many as 1 million iPhones (out of 3.75 million sold) were estimated to have been diverted to the gray market. 5 In general, there is little manufacturers can do to stop this activity: high court rulings in the United States and Europe have upheld the legality of gray market sales as being in the best interest 1 Although we frame this paper as gray market diversion from a foreign to a domestic market, the model is not restricted to geographically separate markets. It equally applies to a situation where a branded manufacturer attempts to price discriminate across di¤erent markets or channels and leakage across the markets or channels is prevalent. 2 Omega sued Costco for selling Omega products without authorization, in violation of Omega's copyright (Aldridge 2011, 328) . In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court heard Costco v. Omega (08-1423) and deadlocked in a 4-4 divided ruling. For details see www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-08/costco-s-swatch-sales-may-lead-high-courtto-limit-gray-market.html and http://www.daily…nance.com/2010/12/13/supreme-court-rules-against-consumers-incostco-vs-omega/. 3 Ibid. 4 Refer to www.agmaglobal.org. 5 "Apple's $300 million gray market dilemma" (see tech.fortune.cnn.com/2008/01/28/apples-300-million-graymarket-dilemma/) of consumers. In the US, the standing Supreme Court precedent ruled that the "…rst sale doctrine" (17 U.S.C. §109(a)) provides a defense to copyright infringement. Thus, companies which legally purchase goods abroad that were intended for foreign consumers can legally resell those goods in the U.S. despite objections of the brand owner. 6 In the European Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has similarly applied the analogous "exhaustion of rights doctrine" (Treaty of Rome, article 30). 7 Since manufacturers cannot stop gray markets, the key issue is how best to manage them: a critical consideration for a …rm when it contemplates entry to a lower priced foreign market is how gray market activity a¤ects overall pro…tability.
The …rst question a manufacturer needs to answer is "does it make sense to enter a lowpriced foreign market given the sales that gray markets may cannibalize domestically?" However, given that foreign entry may be both pro…table and a key element of a …rm's global strategy, a second question is how to best enter the foreign market (given the inevitability of diversion). One alternative is to give local managers autonomy to set foreign production levels to maximize the foreign subsidiary's performance (a decentralized organizational structure). A second alternative is that the …rm makes production decisions for the foreign market at the domestic head o¢ ce (a centralized organizational structure).
The issue of organizational structure is the main question we consider. On the one hand, giving local managers autonomy optimizes local performance. When markets are independent, this autonomy leads to optimal decision making. On the other hand, markets are not independent when there are gray markets. Rather, the gray market is an important externality between the foreign market and the domestic market. The literature suggests that an e¤ective strategy to optimize in the face of an externality is to centralize decision making (Varian 1992) . Moreover, recent research (Antia, Bergen, Dutta and Fisher 2006) advocates centralized decision making to minimize the negative impact of gray market activity. While conventional wisdom suggests that centralization should be e¤ective to internalize the gray market externality, the optimal strategy when faced with a competitor who has similar challenges is not clear.
Accordingly, we construct a model of di¤erentiated product competition to better understand the impact of gray marketing on a …rm's strategic decisions. We consider both the strategic decisions of whether to enter a lower-priced foreign market and, if so, what organizational structure a …rm should establish. We show that organizational structure is a key determinant of performance for a …rm that faces both competition and gray market goods in its domestic market. In addition, we demonstrate the robustness of these …ndings by extending the analysis to a) a situation where the gray marketer is modelled as a competitive fringe and b) a context where …rms engage in price competition after making decisions about capacity.
Literature Review
As noted in Kotler and Keller (2009) , many …rms use multi-channel marketing due to the proliferation of both customer segments and channels. A polar case of the phenomenon is the desire of Western …rms to enter new markets through the establishment of foreign subsidiaries. The driving force behind these new channels is the opportunity to serve new customers pro…tably. Of course, there are costs to adding channels beyond the cost of simply managing and dealing with another customer. As noted by Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, and El-Ansary (2006), these costs include "con‡ict" that may occur when these channels compete for the same customers. This is particularly salient when entrepreneurial gray market …rms divert product from lower priced developing markets back to the domestic market.
Many academics have analyzed the topic of gray markets to better understand their overall e¤ect on an industry. Antia et al. (2006) , Assmus and Wiese (1995) , Weigand (1991) , Cespedes, Corey and Rangan (1988) and Cavusgil and Sikora (1988) take the position that gray markets are a problem for manufacturers for reasons that include losing control of distribution, a decreased ability to price discriminate, and the erosion of brand equity. There is also a stream of literature that examines the impact of gray markets on performance at the …rm level. For example, Li and Robles (2007) suggest that gray markets may generate unanticipated consequences for …rms by sti ‡ing multinationals'incentives to invest in research and development. While …rms often su¤er as a result of gray marketing, Maskus and Chen (2004) and Autrey and Bova (2012) show that global surplus is often increased by gray market activity. This may explain why the courts are reluctant to rule against …rms that facilitate the availability of gray market goods. In any event, diversion creates a complexity that …rms need to manage. Banerji (1990) highlights the challenge of price-discrimination for a monopolist in this context. Surprisingly, he …nds little e¤ort by IBM to stop authorized IBM resellers from supplying unauthorized gray marketers. Perhaps gray markets are not as serious a problem for branded manufacturers as assumed in the popular press. Interestingly, a few studies identify situations in which gray markets do not generate a negative externality for manufacturers. Bucklin (1993) suggests that price erosion in the home market is frequently o¤set by an increase in unit sales, while Ahmadi and Yang (2000) suggest that gray markets might extend the …rm's global reach and improve global pro…ts. Ra¤ and Schmitt (2007) demonstrate that letting retailers trade unsold inventories to the gray market increases retailer orders given demand uncertainty and can lead to higher manufacturer pro…t, and Chen (2009) shows conditions under which gray markets may help a …rm segment its home market via the service level selected by authorized retailers.
A limitation of many gray market studies is that they do not consider the impact of competition on optimal strategies. The standard approach is to examine the challenge of a monopolist who loses the ability to price discriminate as a result of gray markets. Gallini and Hollis (1999) highlight the motivation that a …rm has to prevent or limit gray marketing. Not surprisingly, signi…cant research is dedicated to analyzing the alternatives manufacturers have to limit the impact and magnitude of gray markets. There are also scores of articles in the business press which highlight the negative impact of gray markets and provide guidance on how gray marketing can be minimized (for a typical example see Dove and Hamilton 2008) .
A frequently mentioned alternative to reduce the negative e¤ect of gray market activity is for a manufacturer to centralize decision making at head o¢ ce. After all, the presence of gray market goods invariably requires a source and this source typically does not act in the best interest of the manufacturer. In many (if not all) cases, the source of gray market goods is a foreign subsidiary (or a third party) which has the rights to market the product in another territory.
The role of centralization as a strategy to control foreign subsidiaries is well known (Gatignon and Anderson 1988) . It follows that several papers (e.g., Antia et al. 2006, Assmus and Wiese 1995) propose centralized decision making as a strategy to reduce the negative impact of gray markets. Examples of centralization include product rationing to foreign subsidiaries or uniform pricing across international jurisdictions to eliminate the gray market arbitrage opportunities. There is also empirical evidence to support the idea that centralization is e¤ective to counter gray marketing.
For example, Myers (1999) surveys a sample of U.S. multinationals and …nds that the greater the degree of centralized decision making, the lower the reported incidents of gray market activity. Interestingly, centralized control has also been suggested as a strategy "to keep unauthorized reselling to a minimum" (Doyle 1997 ). Our objective is to challenge this conventional wisdom and to assess whether and when centralization can be e¤ective to minimize the negative impact of gray markets.
Our approach is to study a context where the manufacturer faces a choice of imposing centralized control on a foreign subsidiary or allowing the foreign subsidiary to operate independently. A key objective of the analysis is to examine this question in an environment where two manufacturers compete with each other. This allows us to assess both the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect of gray market goods on a focal manufacturer's pro…ts. Most extant models consider the direct e¤ect of gray market goods on the manufacturer's pro…ts, i.e., the cannibalization of demand for the manufacturer's product in the domestic market. However, our model will also consider the indirect e¤ect of gray market goods on the manufacturer's global pro…t, i.e., the gray market goods of one manufacturer a¤ect the behavior of the existing competitor. This too a¤ects the performance of the focal manufacturer, and the model re ‡ects this.
Summary of Key Findings
Our analysis shows that organizational structure has a signi…cant e¤ect on …rm performance when markets are competitive and gray marketers are active.
It is important to note that under decentralization, each subsidiary sets quantity to maximize local pro…ts: a subsidiary does not internalize the fact that its decisions a¤ect the pro…t earned by the other subsidiary. To be precise, the foreign subsidiary neglects the cannibalization of domestic sales by the gray market product, and the domestic subsidiary ignores the e¤ect that its volume decisions have on gray market demand.
Our model shows that when competing products in the domestic market are highly substitutable, a …rm increases its global pro…t through the adoption of a decentralized structure even though local managers only consider local pro…t performance when making decisions. This …nding holds in a situation where only one …rm has the capability to expand in the foreign market but also in a situation where both …rms have the capability. Additionally, this …nding is not explained by higher gray market volume under decentralization. In fact, with decentralization, gray market quantities can be either higher or lower than the quantities observed under centralized control.
Rather, decentralization plays a subtle role in improving the focal …rm's pro…tability. Speci…-cally, the domestic branch of the …rm makes its decisions based on local pro…t performance when a decentralized organizational structure is implemented. This leads to a domestic branch that is more aggressive with its production decisions: it does not account for lower gray market sales (by the foreign subsidiary). The strategic e¤ect of this is to both limit the negative e¤ect of the gray market and weaken the existing domestic competitor.
In a nutshell, when only one …rm enters the foreign market (say Firm 1), decentralization makes the domestic market more competitive than under centralization. This reduces the size of the domestic pro…t pie. However, as product substitutability increases, decentralization increases the proportion of total domestic pro…ts that accrue to Firm 1 compared to centralization. Thus, decentralization induces a tension between creating lower overall pro…ts for all domestic …rms through increased competition, and increasing Firm 1's proportion of those pro…ts. When the products of Firms 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently similar, the increase in the proportion of total domestic pro…ts that accrue to Firm 1 under decentralization more than o¤sets the reduced size of the domestic pie created by decentralization, leaving Firm 1's domestic arm better o¤. When this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, decentralization leads to higher global pro…ts for Firm 1. This …nding seems to belie conventional wisdom: centralization typically imposes managerial costs on an organization but it is generally associated with higher pro…t potential. Here though, the strategic interaction of channel players is important and decentralization leads to higher pro…ts because it weakens the existing domestic competitor "indirectly".
In contrast, when both …rms can enter the foreign market and the products are highly substitutable, the …rms …nd themselves in a Prisoners'Dilemma. In this situation, the more aggressive stance of the domestic subsidiary makes decentralization the optimal response to a …rm that has a centralized structure. In addition, the optimal response to entry with a decentralized structure is to also adopt a decentralized structure. The more aggressive stances of the subsidiaries in both the domestic and foreign markets however, result in lower equilibrium pro…ts for both …rms. Taken together, we have a general …nding that a decentralized organizational structure is optimal for …rms entering foreign markets when gray markets are active and the degree of substitutability between products is high. However, the e¤ect of organizational structure on pro…ts di¤ers depending on whether only one …rm or both …rms have the capability to enter the foreign market.
When the degree of substitutability between the domestic competitors is high and only one …rm can enter the foreign market, it realizes greater pro…ts as a result of decentralizing. In contrast, when both …rms can enter the foreign market, decentralization is the equilibrium organizational structure yet this outcome is associated with lower pro…ts for both …rms. 8 In a sense, the advantage that leads to the dominance of decentralization when only one …rm enters the foreign market is precisely what leads to more intense competition and lower pro…ts when both …rms enter with a decentralized structure. The optimality of "decentralization" when products are highly substitutable appears to echo the …ndings of McGuire and Staelin (1983) who study the e¤ect of decentralization in a bilateral duopoly. However, in contrast to McGuire and Staelin where both manufacturers bene…t from decentralization as products become more substitutable, here both manufacturers su¤er as a result of their inability to commit to a centralized structure.
Model Setup
We consider a setting where two …rms engage in quantity competition in a domestic market with di¤erentiated products. Each …rm may also sell its product in a foreign country (where competitive prices are lower) through a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. 9 If either …rm enters the foreign market, a gray market …rm might purchase some of the …rm's goods in the foreign market and resell those goods in the domestic market. 10 For simplicity, we assume that the product sold in the foreign market by each …rm is identical to its product in the domestic market.
Interestingly, if a multinational …rm allowed a foreign subsidiary to operate domestically by vertically integrating gray market activity (for example), it would earn strictly higher pro…ts. 11 However, this does not happen for two reasons. First, there might be a backlash when customers realize that two subsidiaries of a …rm are supplying the same product at di¤erent prices. But most importantly, this type of distribution is prohibited by competition or anti-trust law. Though we do not explicitly model retailers, domestically produced goods and gray goods are distributed through retailers. The law obliges any …rm to sell its product at the same price to retailers who compete in the same market. 12 Allowing a foreign subsidiary to sell the same product at a di¤erent price would violate this regulation (since a foreign subsidiary is de jure the same company).
We consider two competitive situations in the model. The …rst is a situation where only one domestic competitor has the ability to enter the foreign market. In the second situation, both …rms have the ability to enter the foreign market. In addition to making the entry decision, a …rm that decides to enter also makes a decision about organizational structure. The model considers two organizational options. First, a …rm can choose to control both the domestic and foreign 9 For simplicity, we examine a model with a domestic market with higher price levels and one foreign market with lower price levels. However, as correctly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the logic of the model applies to the diversion of product from any number of lower priced markets back to a higher priced domestic market. 1 0 We assume that domestic consumers are not capable of purchasing goods in the foreign market. Relative to consumers, the gray marketer has specialized knowledge where to …nd appropriate goods and has expertise in transhipping. Gray markets exist precisely because the per-unit transaction costs of domestic consumers to acquire foreign goods are signi…cantly higher than the those of the gray marketer. 1 1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for having made this insightful observation. 1 2 In Canada, the relevant law is Price Discrimination Enforcement Guidelines section 50 (1) (a) of the Competition Act. In the US, the relevant law is the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, section 2a. subsidiary centrally. In this setting, both production decisions are made by managers in the head o¢ ce. Such a structure implies that production quantities are set to account for the impact of each decision on total …rm pro…t (centralized control). Alternately, a …rm can choose to decentralize and give the domestic and foreign subsidiary pro…t responsibility and control of their respective production decisions (decentralized control). A decentralized structure implies that the manager in each country makes decisions to optimize local pro…ts. 13 We assume that the product's marginal cost is constant and (without loss of generality) zero, and pro…ts in the domestic and foreign market are of equal value. Without loss of generality, we further assume that the cost of shipping gray marketed product back to the domestic market is negligible. The model thus focuses on a situation where the e¤ects of the gray market are as high as possible to understand how it can be managed e¤ectively.
We begin with a model of Cournot quantity competition, in which the two rival …rms (the Stackelberg leaders) choose quantity …rst, anticipating the subsequent quantity choice by the gray marketer (the Stackelberg follower). We structure our analysis as a game of quantity competition for two reasons. provides a complete description of how the gray market for cigarettes operates. Speci…cally, gray marketers do not set prices for their goods. Instead, they buy quantities of goods in one market based on their belief about the prices that they can obtain for the goods in the higher priced market.
There is no guarantee of prices before the goods are acquired and o¤ered for resale in the higher priced market. If the gray marketer buys too much product, then it is faced with a problem of trying to liquidate stock and this reduces pro…tability.
For these reasons, we feel that the Cournot model is an appropriate representation of the economy when a gray market …rm is present. For robustness however, we present two alternative models of competition in Section 3.5. In the …rst alternative, we model the gray market as a competitive fringe player. In the fringe model, the gray marketer has no market power and is a price taker in the domestic market. In the second alternative, we present a model of Bertrand price competition with capacity constraints. In this setting, the two …rms …rst choose manufacturing capacity before engaging in price competition. The main model results are robust to either of these alternative formulations.
Firm organizational decision
The …rst decision made by …rms is whether to: a) enter the foreign market with a decentralized structure, b) enter the foreign market with a centralized structure or c) not enter the foreign market. Firms make this decision knowing that the gray marketer may divert a fraction of foreign production to the domestic market. Under a decentralized structure, the individual country subsidiaries maximize local pro…t in their respective markets. In a centralized structure, the central headquarters maximizes overall …rm pro…t. We denote the strategy set for both 
Demand structure and timeline
After choosing their organizational structure, Firms 1 and 2 choose quantities and the market demand determines the resulting price. The domestic demand for each …rm is as follows:
where q i 0 is the quantity sold at price p i by Firm i in the domestic market, q Gi 0 is the gray market quantity diverted from Firm i's foreign market, and 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of substitutability between the products of Firms 1 and 2.
The foreign subsidiaries face the following demand functions, where F 2 (0; 1):
where q F i 0 is the quantity sold at price p F i by Firm i in the foreign market.
The gray marketer's demand for each …rm's product, q Gi , is determined endogenously to maximize pro…t and is incremental to the demand that each foreign subsidiary obtains from local customers, q F i . We assume that the gray marketer diverts product from the foreign market and sells it in the domestic market. Thus, the gray marketer's pro…t per unit is p i p F i , the price differential observed between the domestic and foreign markets. 14 Note that if the price in the foreign market is su¢ ciently high, the gray market will not function. Alternatively, if the equilibrium price in the foreign market is su¢ ciently low, domestic …rms will not enter the foreign market. 15 Given the anticipated gray market activity, the entry decisions and the organizational structures that have been chosen, Firms 1 and 2 (the Stackelberg leaders) choose quantities (local and foreign, where applicable) to maximize their pro…ts. Next, the gray marketer (the Stackelberg follower) assesses the pro…tability of acquiring a quantity of product in the foreign market and reselling that same quantity in the domestic market. In fact, we assume that the gray marketer acquires a "pro…t-maximizing" quantity in the foreign market and resells it in the domestic market at the market clearing price. Of course, when the gray market is active, the volume sold in the domestic market is higher and naturally, this leads to a lower equilibrium domestic price.
Consistent with standard Cournot models, product prices in the domestic and foreign markets (respectively) are determined such that the market clears (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995).
This game structure assumes that a) foreign consumers and the gray marketer pay the same price for product purchased in the foreign market and b) the gray marketer and the respective domestic …rm each receive the same price for product sold in the domestic market. The timing of the decisions in the game is shown in Figure 1 .
Decentralized Decision Making (only one …rm can enter)
Without loss of generality, we assume that Firm 1 is the player that has the capability to enter the foreign market. If Q is the total production of Firm 1's foreign subsidiary, the objective functions for Firm 1 are:
The model is robust to restricting the gray market's selling price to some fraction < 1 of the authorized channel's price, or pi instead of pi. As pointed out by a reviewer, this re ‡ects a situation in which gray market goods are sold at a discount relative to domestically produced goods. With this alternative speci…cation, the results are identical, although the smaller is , the less important controlling the gray market becomes. For simplicity, we omit the parameter. 1 5 When the price in the foreign market is su¢ ciently low, gray market goods collapse pro…ts in the domestic market and the only bene…ciary of foreign entry is the gray marketer.
3) Gray marketer chooses quantity(s) given demand conditions and the quantities chosen by manufacturers.
1) Manufacturer(s) make entry decision (N, D or C)
4) The market clears 2) Manufacturers simultaneously set domestic quantities and foreign quantities (where applicable)
Figure 1: Timeline
The objective function for Firm 2 is:
and for the gray marketer:
subject to the following constraints:
Following the standard approach to solve Stackelberg games, we solve the gray marketer's problem …rst and this generates a reaction function for q G as a function of the quantities produced by the manufacturers in the …rst stage. This is then substituted into the objective functions for Firm 1's domestic subsidiary, Firm 1's foreign subsidiary and Firm 2's objective function. These functions are optimized with respect to q 1 , q 2 and q F respectively to create a system of three equations in three unknowns.
Decentralized Decision Making (both …rms can enter)
The objective functions for Firm 1 are:
The objective functions for Firm 2 are:
As before, the gray marketer's problem is solved …rst and this generates reaction functions for q G1
and q G2 as a function of the quantities produced by the manufacturers in the …rst stage. These are then substituted into the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2. These objective functions are optimized with respect to q 1 , q F 1 ; q 2 and q F 2 respectively to create a system of four equations in four unknowns.
Centralized Decision Making (only one …rm can enter)
As before, if Q is the total production of Firm 1's foreign subsidiary, the objective function for Firm 1 is:
subject to (6) and (7). Note that the constraints (i.e. the demand functions) are una¤ected by the organizational structure of the …rms.
The gray marketer's problem is solved …rst and this generates a reaction function for q G as a function of the quantities produced by the manufacturers in the …rst stage. This is then substituted into the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2. In contrast to the decentralized case, Firm 1 has one objective function and it is optimized with respect to q 1 and q F simultaneously. This generates a system of three equations in three unknowns.
Centralized Decision Making (both …rms can enter)
The objective function for Firm 1 is:
subject to (11), (12) and (13).
As before, the gray marketer's problem is solved …rst and this generates reaction functions for q G1 and q G2 as a function of the quantities produced by the manufacturers in the …rst stage.
These are then substituted into the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2. These functions are then optimized with respect to q 1 , q F 1 ; q 2 and q F 2 respectively to create a system of four equations in four unknowns.
Asymmetric Decision Making (both …rms enter)
Here, we assume that Firm 1 operates with a centralized structure and Firm 2 operates with a decentralized structure and both …rms enter the foreign market. The objective function for Firm 1 is:
subject to (11) , (12), and (13) .
To solve the model where the …rms are asymmetric, the gray marketer's reaction functions for q G1 and q G2 as a function of of the quantities produced by the manufacturers are substituted into the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2. These functions are then optimized with respect to q 1 , q F 1 ; q 2 and q F 2 respectively to create a system of four equations in four unknowns.
Model Analysis
We begin by deriving each …rm's optimal quantity choice and resulting pro…ts under the possible organizational structures. For each structure, we …rst analyze the simple setting when only Firm 1 can enter the foreign market and then present the results when both …rms can enter. We then analyze the resulting equilibria and discuss the implications of our results.
For each of the settings, we restrict all quantities to be non-negative. Domestic quantity is always non-negative because 2 [0; 1] and F < 1. However, the gray market is only non-negative when F is su¢ ciently low. We de…ne m i ( ) and n i ( ) as the upper bound of F for which q Gi 0 with a decentralized and centralized structure respectively. We also require q F i 0; F must be su¢ ciently large that the optimal quantity in the foreign market is non-negative. 16 It should be noted that the equilibrium pro…t for the …rms when neither enters the foreign market is =
( +2)
2 . Therefore, a decision to enter the foreign market by one of the …rms (given that the competitor does not have foreign operations) must yield an increase versus this level of pro…ts.
Decentralized Structure
Only Firm 1 can enter the foreign market (Decentralized)
Solving the …rst order conditions presented in the appendix, we derive the following solution in terms of quantities for the decentralized case when only one …rm enters the foreign market. For brevity, we do not present the …rst order conditions and move directly to the optimal quantities. 
We de…ne f 1 ( ) as the lower bound of F for which Firm 1 enters the foreign market with a decentralized structure. A small F has two e¤ects on Firm 1's entry decision. First, there is lower pro…t potential from entering the foreign market. Second, the gray market's cost base is correspondingly lower and the gray market cannibalizes more of Firm 1's domestic sales. For F su¢ ciently low, Firm 1 does not enter the market because the loss of domestic sales to the gray market more than o¤sets the pro…t potential of entering the foreign market. The expression for f 1 ( ) is provided in the Appendix. Figure 2 shows the parameter region where Firm 1 will enter the market (above f 1 ( ), the solid line). Figure 2 also illustrates the infeasible region above the cuto¤ m 1 ( ), where the gray market quantity is zero. In this region, the market price in the foreign market is higher than in the domestic market. Thought of another way, this is theoretically a region where the gray market would ‡ow in the opposite direction, from the domestic market to the foreign market. Because the focus of our analysis is to understand the challenge of a domestic …rm entering a low-priced foreign market where a gray marketer funnels product back to the domestic market, we focus our attention on the feasible region between f 1 ( ) and m 1 ( ):
Both Firms can enter the foreign market (Decentralized)
Solving the …rst order conditions presented in the appendix, we derive the following solution in terms of quantities for the decentralized case when both …rms enter the foreign market.
and q F 1 = q F 2 = 9F + 11F + 3F 2 1 26 + 16 2 + 3 3 + 13 (27) q G1 = q G2 = 5 6F + 3 4F 2( + 1) (13 + 3 2 + 13)
These quantities imply the following pro…ts for the three players. Solving the …rst order conditions presented in the appendix, the unique solution in terms of quantities for the centralized case when only one …rm enters the foreign market is:
These imply the following pro…ts for the three players. We de…ne g 1 ( ) as the lower bound of F for which Firm 1 enters the foreign market with a centralized structure. Similar to the decentralized case, when F is su¢ ciently low, Firm 1 does not enter the market because the loss of domestic sales to the gray market more than o¤sets the pro…t potential of entering the foreign market. 17 The expression for g 1 ( ) is provided in the Appendix. The feasible zone for gray marketing in the case of a centralized structure is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 also illustrates the infeasible region above the cuto¤ n 1 ( ), where the gray market quantity violates the non-negativity constraint under a centralized organizational structure. As in the decentralized case, the market price in the foreign market is higher than in the domestic market in this region. Solving the …rst order conditions presented in the appendix, we derive the following solution in terms of quantities for the centralized case when both …rms establish foreign subsidiaries.
and
These imply the following pro…ts for the three players.
and g = 2 9
(1 F )
Asymmetric Structure
Solving the …rst order conditions presented in the appendix, we derive the solution in terms of quantities for the asymmetric case when Firm 1 is centralized and Firm 2 is decentralized: 
The pro…t expressions for each …rm implied by these quantities are provided in the appendix.
Equilibrium Analysis
As noted above, the strategy set for both …rms in the …rst stage of the game is s i = fN =no entry; D =entry with decentralized control; C =entry with centralized controlg. A decision to enter the foreign market by one of the …rms (given that the competitor does not have foreign operations) must yield an increase versus the pro…ts earned by the …rm when neither …rm enters the foreign market (denoted fN; N g). Accordingly, we take the fN; N g equilibrium as our benchmark case and analyze when the …rms have a pro…table incentive to deviate from this outcome.
For ease of exposition and without loss of generality, we frame the following discussion of best responses in terms of the focal …rm, Firm 1. We then derive and discuss the implications of the resulting equilibria. 2 without entry, entry only occurs when Firm 1 increases its pro…ts from this level, i.e. when F > f 1 ( ) if Firm 1 chooses a decentralized structure or F > g 1 ( ) when its structure is centralized.
We de…ne the cuto¤ value B N as the boundary separating the regions where Firm 1's decentralized pro…t is higher than its centralized pro…t and Firm 2 does not enter the foreign market.
The results when only one …rm has the capability to enter the foreign market are summarized in Proposition 1. To clarify the exposition, it is useful to de…ne N =
Moreover, the boundary B N is comprised of two functions: F N and F N which we de…ne in the Appendix. The functions F N and F N are de…ned over the interval [ N ; 1), so the equilibrium at = 1 is identi…ed separately.
Proposition 1 When only one …rm can enter the market, Firm 1's best decision is:
1. Non-entry when F < g 1 ( ) and F < f 1 ( ). Figure 4 illustrates Firm 1's best response function when only it has the capability to enter the foreign market. In the region to the right of B N where F is feasible (i.e. the gray market exists and foreign entry leads to higher pro…t for Firm 1), decentralized entry is more pro…table than centralized entry. In contrast, to the left of B N , centralized entry is more pro…table. In other words, when the competing products are highly substitutable and it is in Firm 1's interest to enter the foreign market, the optimal decision is to enter with a decentralized organization.
This result is surprising given that under decentralization, neither the domestic nor the foreign subsidiary account for the pro…t implications of their decisions on the subsidiary that operates in the other country. Indeed, the failure to incorporate demand interdependencies leads to both subsidiaries choosing higher quantities than in a centralized setting. In particular, under decentralization, Firm 1's domestic arm does not account for its quantity choice having a negative impact on The counterpoint to the e¤ect that Firm 1's decentralization has on the total pro…t pie is the e¤ect that Firm 1's decentralization has on Firm 2's production decision. Because decentralization leads to aggressive production decisions by both of Firm 1's subsidiaries, decentralization weakens Firm 2: the more substitutable the products are, the more pronounced the e¤ect. The increased level of competition in the domestic market causes Firm 2 to choose a lower production quantity.
Recall that under Cournot competition, the decisions of competing …rms are strategic substitutes (Tirole 1990 ). The reduced quantity chosen by Firm 2 leads to higher pro…t for Firm 1. In other words, foreign entry with a decentralized structure is associated with a tension between two e¤ects:
1. A reduction in the overall pro…ts available for …rms in the domestic market, and 2. Firm 1 capturing a larger proportion of the pro…ts that are available.
When is su¢ ciently high (i.e., the products are highly substitutable), the increase in the proportion of total pro…ts that accrue to Firm 1 under decentralization more than o¤sets the reduced size of the pie and leads to higher pro…ts for Firm 1 -both domestically and globally. Figure 5 shows the impact of the equilibrium organizational structure on the pro…tability of each subsidiary. To the left of the diagonal bold line, the domestic subsidiary pro…t is higher under centralization; above the dashed bold line, the foreign subsidiary pro…t is higher under centralization. Note that when products are not highly substitutable, both subsidiaries have higher pro…t under centralization for a large portion of the feasible region. Moving to the right, as products become moderately substitutable, the domestic subsidiary's pro…ts can be lower under centralization, but the higher foreign pro…ts given centralization are still su¢ cient to o¤set lower domestic pro…ts, so that the …rm is still better o¤ with the centralization option.
However, to the right of B N , the collective pro…t shifts to favor decentralization. In the region below the dashed line, both subsidiaries generate higher pro…t under decentralization. Above the dashed line to the right of B N , the improved domestic subsidiary's pro…t under decentralization more than o¤sets the lower pro…tability of the foreign subsidiary. In sum, the primary objective Finally, we note that the dominance of decentralization when products are highly substitutable is not explained by higher gray market volume under centralization. As depicted in Figure 6 , with decentralization, gray market quantities can be higher or lower than the quantities observed under centralized control. The dashed line separates the region where gray market volume is higher with centralization compared to decentralization. Above the dashed line, centralization leads to higher gray market volume than decentralization; below the dashed line, the opposite is true.
This observation highlights an important aspect of managing gray markets. 18 For …rms, a key bene…t of foreign borders (not to mention the geographic distance that often separates countries)
is the opportunity it provides to charge di¤erent groups of customers di¤erent prices. This is critical in the conditions we examine where the "willingness to pay" for two groups of customers is signi…cantly di¤erent. Cursory analysis would suggest that the most straightforward approach to retain pro…ts in these conditions is to minimize or eliminate leakage between the groups of customers. In fact, the legal actions we cite in the introduction re ‡ect this perspective on gray markets. Our analysis shows that unless a …rm can prohibit gray marketing through legal action (which is di¢ cult outside of categories like pharmaceuticals), minimizing gray market volume is not the correct criterion. Sometimes the optimal strategy for a …rm is to allow a larger gray market volume. This is precisely the case in Figure 6 above the dashed line to the left of B N and below the dashed line to the right of B N .
The key factor in determining a …rm's optimal organizational structure is the competitiveness of the gray market …rm relative to the original domestic competitor. Speci…cally:
1. When a …rm has a signi…cant degree of monopoly power in the domestic market ( is low), the most important criterion is to manage the gray market such that the externality is internalized.
This is achieved with a centralized structure.
2. In contrast, when a …rm does not enjoy monopoly power ( is high), the most important criterion is to use the gray market as a weapon to weaken the domestic competitor. This is achieved with a decentralized structure.
We now consider a situation where both domestic …rms have the ability to enter the foreign market.
Similar to this section, we assume that diverted product from a foreign subsidiary is a perfect substitute for the domestic version of that …rm's product.
Equilibrium when both …rms can enter the foreign market
When Firm 2 also chooses whether to enter the foreign market and the organizational structure to adopt in the event of entry, the analysis and resulting intuition strongly parallel the decision of Firm 1 in Section 3.4.1 (when only Firm 1 has the ability to enter the foreign market). In particular, if Firm 2 chooses not to enter the foreign market, Firm 1's optimal entry strategy is depicted in Figure 4 . If however, Firm 2 chooses to enter the foreign market and it adopts a decentralized structure, Firm 1's optimal response in terms of entry and structure is shown in Figure A1 in the appendix. If Firm 2 chooses to enter the foreign market and it adopts a centralized structure, Firm 1's optimal response is shown in Figure A2 in the appendix.
To clarify the analysis, we de…ne B S 2 as the boundary in ( but in all three cases: a) B S 2 is a border which divides the parameter space into low and high levels of and b) B S 2 is a threshold to the left of which Firm 1's optimal organizational structure is centralized, and to the right of which Firm 1's optimal structure is decentralized (given that the feasibility constraints are satis…ed). Similar to the analysis in Section 3.4.1, for each of the three cases, we de…ne a critical value S 2 and the two functions: F S 2 and F S 2 that form the basis for the boundaries (these are de…ned in the Appendix). We also identify the equilibrium at the endpoint ( = 1) separately. 19 The lemma is written for the general case of B S 2 and as in the single …rm entry game, the best response is not related to the level of gray market volume.
Lemma 1 Given a strategy s 2 by Firm 2, Firm 1's optimal strategy is 1. Non-entry when F < g 1 ( ) and F < f 1 ( ).
Centralized entry
(a) when < S 2 and F > g 1 ( ) (b) when 2 [ S 2 ; 1) and either F > F S 2 or both F < F S 2 and F > g 1 ( ): Although the best responses and resulting intuition parallel the single …rm entry situation, there is an important di¤erence between the one …rm and two …rm entry contexts. In particular, Firm 2 faces a symmetric situation to Firm 1. The objective of the analysis (given a speci…c set of parameters) is to …nd a strategy set for the two …rms in the …rst stage of the game where neither …rm has an incentive to deviate. As explained earlier, Firm i's strategy is denoted s i 2 fN; D or Cg. We de…ne equilibrium as a strategy pair fs 1 ; s 2 g where both strategies are best responses to the strategy of the competitor. In certain regions of the parameter space, we …nd that multiple equilibria are possible. In particular, for an intermediate range of , we …nd two pure strategy equilibria fD; Dg and fC; Cg and the mixed equilibria that obtains when there exist two pure strategy equilibria. For simplicity, when we …nd multiple equilibria in a given parameter region, we highlight the Pareto optimal equilibrium for that region (details of the other equilibria are provided in the appendix).
This is especially pertinent given the starting point of our analysis (i.e. neither …rm is operational in the foreign market). Said di¤erently, we assume that …rms will not enter the foreign market if We formalize the result of the game in which both …rms can enter the foreign market in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Provided F is feasible:
1. In Region I, both …rms choose centralized entry.
2. In Region II, both …rms choose centralized entry.
3. In Region III, both …rms choose decentralized entry.
4. In Region IV, both …rms choose not to enter.
In Region III where fD; Dg is the unique equilibrium, the …rms would realize higher pro…ts were they to both enter with centralized structures. However, in this region the best response to centralized entry by the competitor is decentralized entry and the best response to decentralized entry is also decentralized entry. Thus, Region III constitutes a region characterized by Prisoners'Dilemma type payo¤s. Both …rms are worse o¤ because the option of foreign entry with a decentralized structure is available.
We also note that for values of F just above the Region IV boundary f 1 ( jN ) and g 1 ( jN ), there exist areas for which a di¤erent version of the Prisoner's Dilemma occurs (i.e., pro…t is higher for non-entry by both …rms, but the equilibrium is either fC; Cg or fD; Dg). In this region, once a rival …rm enters the foreign market, the focal …rm su¤ers substantial cannibalization of its domestic sales. As a result, its optimal response is to mimic the competitor and enter the foreign market.
However, once both …rms have entered the foreign market, the …rms realize lower pro…ts compared to the pro…ts that would have been realized had neither …rm entered the foreign market.
Corollary 1 summarizes the key result of this section. In particular, when the products of Firm 1 and 2 are su¢ ciently close substitutes and entry is optimal, both …rms have a dominant strategy:
enter the foreign market and adopt a decentralized organizational structure.
Corollary 1 When the products of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are su¢ ciently close substitutes, the unique equilibrium in the feasible range is decentralized entry by both …rms.
The primary implication of Corollary 1 is that the equilibrium organizational structure of decentralization does not depend on only one …rm having the capability to enter the foreign market (the key …nding of Section 3.4.1). Having a decentralized organization is the equilibrium structure when the competing …rms (in the domestic market) have products that are highly substitutable.
This …nding is independent of how many …rms enter the foreign market. Naturally, in this model, the choice of organizational structure is irrelevant when there is no gray market: the production decisions of both centralized and decentralized managers are identical when demand in the two countries is independent. However, when there are gray markets, it is interesting to …nd that decentralization can dominate centralization as a structure for foreign expansion independent of the competitor's foreign expansion plans. In summary, the analysis shows that the incentive to "internalize" the gray market externality is mitigated by the pre-existing level of competition in the domestic market.
Alternative models of competition
In this section, we assess the impact of alternate forms of competition as a robustness check for the results of our main model.
Gray Market as Competitive Fringe
We …rst model the gray marketer as a price-taking competitive fringe player. As a fringe player, the gray marketer does not face a downward-sloping demand curve in the domestic market but instead, faces a cost disadvantage that is exacerbated as gray market volume increases. 21 Thus, the gray marketer's pro…t per unit in this formulation equals the price di¤erential observed between the domestic and foreign markets, minus a supply cost that increases in quantity. The objective functions for the gray marketer, in the one-entry and two-entry case respectively, are replaced with (39) and (40) below:
The competitive fringe model assumes that the gray marketer …lls a pro…t-maximizing portion of the domestic market demand at the prevailing market price, which is una¤ected by gray market sales (because the gray marketer has no market power). After choosing organizational structure, both …rms choose quantities (local and foreign, as applicable) and the residual market demand determines the resulting price. As in the main model, foreign consumers and the gray marketer pay the same price for product purchased in the foreign market. Because the gray marketer is a price taker by assumption, the gray marketer receives the domestic market price for each …rm's product in the domestic market.
When one …rm enters the foreign market, we solve the gray marketer's problem in (39) with respect to q G which, in turn, generates a reaction function for q G . This reaction function is then substituted into the objective functions for Firm 1's domestic subsidiary, Firm 1's foreign subsidiary and Firm 2. These functions are optimized with respect to q 1 , q 2 and q F , respectively, to create a system of three equations in three unknowns.
When two …rms enter the foreign market, the gray marketer's problem is solved by optimizing pro…ts in (40) with respect to q G1 and q G2 : This optimization generates reaction functions for q G1 and q G2 . These reaction functions are then substituted into the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2, which are then optimized with respect to q 1 , q F 1 ; q 2 and q F 2 respectively to create a system of four equations in four unknowns.
This competitive fringe formulation generates optimal quantities and prices that are identical to the main model. As a result, the optimal pro…ts for Firms 1 and 2 are identical to the corresponding …rm-entry and organization structure settings in the main model. 22 Thus, the competitive fringe formulation produces identical optimal entry and organizational structure choices compared to the main model for both the one-…rm and two-…rm entry cases.
Price Competition with Capacity Constraints
Our …nal formulation is a model of Bertrand price competition with capacity constraints where one …rm enters the foreign market. In this game, each …rm …rst chooses organizational structure, which determines the decision maker for the capacity and pricing decisions (i.e., the local subsidiary or the head o¢ ce). Then, each …rm chooses production capacities in the domestic and foreign markets.
Next, the …rms choose prices p 1 , p 2 and p F in the domestic and foreign markets, and market demand determines the quantity sold at that price. Finally, the gray marketer is a competitive fringe player (and thus a price taker) that maximizes the objective function described in (39) with respect to (1) and (2) to obtain the equivalent domestic and foreign demand for each …rm as follows:
As in the Cournot model, gray market demand, q G , is determined endogenously and is incremental to local demand from foreign customers, q F . However, in contrast to the Cournot game, the objective functions of Firms 1 and 2 are optimized with respect to prices p 1 , p 2 and p F in the pricing game. Finally, the optimal prices p 1 , p 2 and p F in ‡uence the production capacities chosen by the manufacturers in the …rst stage.
In equilibrium, we …nd that …rms install precisely the capacity that is demanded given their chosen prices. On the one hand, there is no incentive to install excess capacity that would be idle;
on the other hand, if …rms install less capacity than the quantity demanded for a given price point, the …rms would leave unsatis…ed demand and would be better o¤ choosing a higher price. To solve the game technically with capacity constraints, the pricing reaction functions for the end game are determined based on the capacities selected in the …rst stage. This leads to a reaction function for each manufacturer with a discontinuity at the point where the optimal price (p ) leads to demand exactly equal to the capacity selected in the …rst stage. At prices less than p , each …rm has a reaction function that is " ‡atter" re ‡ecting a reduced incentive to cut price when a …rm operates at capacity. In fact, at prices less than p , the optimal reaction is for the …rm to set price such that the quantity demanded equals capacity (precisely). This structure e¤ectively allows a …rm to "choose" a point on the competitor's reaction function that optimizes its pro…t (by restricting capacity, the …rm moves the discontinuity away from the origin).
It is straightforward to demonstrate that both …rms have an incentive to restrict capacity when capacities are set at the quantities that would be chosen in a game without capacity restrictions.
In an untabulated technical appendix we show that, in the one-entry case, the Bertrand model with capacity constraints generates identical optimal quantities and prices to the main model. In addition, the pro…t functions and optimal pro…ts for Firms 1 and 2 in the Bertrand model are the same as in the main model, independent of either …rm's entry or organizational structure decision. 24 As a result, the Bertrand model with capacity constraints leads to optimal entry and organizational structure results that are identical to the main model.
Total Welfare
In an untabulated technical appendix, we illustrate that total welfare (i.e., aggregate consumer and producer surplus across both the domestic and foreign economies) is strictly higher when …rms enter the foreign market with a decentralized, rather than a centralized, organizational structure.
This result makes sense because, although gray market volume may be higher or lower with decentralized entry, total volume (i.e., aggregate quantity produced across all …rms) is strictly higher with decentralized entry. A higher global volume leads to greater global competition, lower market prices, greater global consumer surplus, and higher total global welfare. Moreover, in the situation where only one …rm can enter the foreign market and the competing products are highly substitutable, decentralized entry is not only pro…t-maximizing for the focal …rm, but also increases total welfare.
Conclusion
In this section, we review the key insights of our analysis and highlight several limitations that are useful to interpret the …ndings. We then provide a closing summary.
Key Insights
The fundamental insight provided by our analysis is that multinational …rms can use organizational structure -in particular, the decision rights over who sets production levels -to manage competition in the presence of gray markets. In a centralized organization, the head o¢ ce controls production choices, whereas in a decentralized organization, the individual subsidiaries are granted autonomy over production to maximize local performance.
When gray markets are active, we document a tension between maximizing the global industry pro…t pie and maximizing a …rm's share of global industry pro…ts. Maximizing the global industry pro…t pie occurs with centralized control due to "internalization" of the externality created by gray markets. Maximizing a …rm's share of the global pro…t pie occurs with decentralized control due to the more aggressive decisions of locally motivated decision makers. The optimal organizational structure is driven by how …ercely …rms compete, i.e. the level of di¤erentiation between competing products. In our model, di¤erentiation is represented by the degree of substitutability between the two domestic products. When competing products are highly substitutable (the level of di¤erentia-tion between products is low), the primary need of each …rm is to capture as much of the market as possible. This is achieved with decentralized control. Decentralized control leads to more aggressive decisions by local managers, which in turn leads to defensive responses from the competitor. This outcome is advantageous when the level of substitutability is high.
Importantly, this …nding is not the result of one structure leading to less activity in the gray market. Even when decentralization is the optimal structure, the resulting gray market volume can be higher or lower compared to the volume observed under centralization. The key concern that a¤ects the optimal structure is to control the factor which has the greatest negative e¤ect on …rm pro…ts. When the level of competition between domestic products is intense, the factor which has the strongest negative e¤ect on …rm pro…ts is the competitor. Here, decentralized structure is superior to weaken the competitor. In contrast, when the level of competition between products is low, the factor which has the most negative e¤ect on …rm pro…ts is the gray market. The impact of this factor is best mitigated with centralized control which internalizes the negative e¤ect of the gray market.
Limitations
As with all analytical models, these results are subject to limitations. For tractability, we restrict the analysis to an industry where all subsidiaries make their production decisions simultaneously.
In some cases, this may not accurately re ‡ect how production decisions are made in a multinational …rm, especially when the fraction of foreign production that leaks back to the domestic market can be forecast with a high degree of accuracy. We have conducted preliminary analysis of a situation where the fraction of leakage is known ex ante. While there are subtle di¤erences in the …ndings, we continue to …nd that when the competing products in the domestic market are highly substitutable, decentralized control is bene…cial for …rms that enter the low-priced foreign market.
We also abstract away from individual players that may be active in the distribution channel.
In particular, resellers and distributors may participate in gray market activity and manufacturers may employ strategies to curtail gray market activity outside of quantity and pricing decisions (e.g., lobbying regulators, conducting investigations, penalties for breaching contracts by selling outside authorized channels, etc.). These issues are not re ‡ected in our analysis.
Finally, our single-period model does not re ‡ect the intertemporal tradeo¤s that …rms contemplating global expansion consider in their planning. For example, our model is static and does not re ‡ect the potential growth that may occur in a foreign market or the value that gaining an early foothold in such a market may deliver (despite the immediate problem it creates for the …rm in terms of gray market goods). We leave further analysis arising from these limitations to the future.
Summary
As the global …rm is the ultimate originator of all gray market goods, the gray market problem appears to have an obvious solution. Why not centralize the production decision of the foreign subsidiary to minimize the negative impact of the gray market? A centralized decision maker would account for the gray market in making production decisions. In contrast to this thinking, our analysis demonstrates that there can be a structural advantage to decentralizing production decisions in the presence of endogenous leakage across markets. This result obtains when competing products are highly substitutable. Accordingly, this study identi…es new insight into the empirical regularity that global …rms often empower their overseas subsidiaries to operate independently and set production levels even when the threat of foreign production being diverted back to the domestic market is high.
Three managerial implications follow from our analysis. First, when a …rm plans to expand internationally, the degree to which competitive products are close substitutes should play a role in the organizational structure decision, in addition to factors such as local knowledge, the need to motivate local management and regulatory restrictions. Second, while coordination between competitors can violate antitrust law within a country, there is little supra-national legal restriction regarding a …rm's strategic choice of organizational structure during entry into a foreign market. Finally, managers should not necessarily be instructed to minimize gray market volume as sometimes pro…ts are optimized with higher gray market volume.
We also demonstrate that, although global pro…ts can be higher in a world where all …rms centralize their production decisions (or in some cases where no …rms enter the foreign market), the strategic advantage of decentralization may cause …rms to deviate from the centralization (or non-entry) path. In a market where competing products are highly substitutable, decentralization is appealing precisely because it provides a …rm the opportunity to steal business from a competitor that employs centralized control or only has domestic operations. However, when the competitor has the ability to neutralize the business-stealing advantage of decentralization (by decentralizing itself), the bene…t of decentralizing disappears and …rms are strictly worse o¤.
Appendix
Sketch of Solution in the Decentralized Case where Firm 1 enters the Foreign Market
The gray marketers problem is to optimize G = (p 1 p F ) q G with respect to the choice of q G . This implies that the gray marketer's optimization is:
Substituting in q G and di¤erentiating the objective functions for Firm 1 (the domestic and foreign pro…t functions) and Firm 2, we obtain the following …rst order conditions.
Solving these expressions for q 1 ; q 2 and q F , leads to the unique solution provided in the main text.
In order for Firm 1 to enter the market, 1 >
( +2)
2 is a necessary condition. This implies that F > f 1 ( ) is a necessary condition where = m 1 ( ):
Sketch of Solution in the Decentralized Case where both …rms enter the Foreign Market
The gray marketers problem is to optimize G = (p 1 p F 1 ) q G1 + (p 2 p F 2 ) q G2 with respect to the choice of q G1 and q G2 . This leads to the following …rst order conditions for the gray marketer:
This leads to the following reaction functions for the gray marketer:
Substituting and di¤erentiating the objective functions for Firms 1 and 2 (the domestic and foreign pro…t functions), we obtain the following …rst order conditions.
Solving these expressions for q 1 ; q 2 ; q F 1 and q F 2 , leads to the unique solution provided in the main text.
Sketch of Solution in the Centralized Case where Firm 1 enters the Foreign Market
Substituting and di¤erentiating the objective functions for Firms 1 and 2, we obtain the following …rst order conditions.
Solving these expressions for q 1 ; q 2 and q F , leads to the unique solution provided in the main text. In order for Firm 1 to enter the market, 1 >
( +2)
2 is a necessary condition. This implies that F > g 1 ( ) is a necessary condition where = n 1 ( ).
b
Sketch of Solution in the Centralized Case where Both Firms enter the Foreign Market
The gray marketer's problem is una¤ected by the organizational structure of the competing …rms so the reactions function for the gray marketer in the centralized conditions are identical to equation (vi). Substituting and di¤erentiating the objective functions for Firms 1 and 2 (the domestic and foreign pro…t functions), we obtain the following …rst order conditions.
Sketch of Solution to the Asymmetric Case where Both Firms enter the Foreign Market
As before, the gray marketer's problem is una¤ected by the organizational structure of the competing …rms so the reactions function for the gray marketer in the centralized conditions are identical to equation (vi). Substituting and di¤erentiating the objective functions for Firms 1 and 2 (the domestic and foreign pro…t functions), we obtain the following …rst order conditions.
Solving these expressions for q 1 ; q 2 ; q F 1 and q F 2 , leads to the unique solution provided in the main text. These lead to the following pro…t expressions for each of the three …rms. To highlight the di¤erent structures associated with each …rm, we replace the …rms identi…ers, 1 and 2, with the subscripts cent and decent. The discriminant DS C = 0 when = C = 
When > C , the boundary B C is de…ned by F C for F > When the market characteristics ( ; F ) lie to the left of B S 2 , then Firm 1's pro…t is higher under centralized entry than under decentralized entry. Conversely, when the market characteristics ( ; F ) lie to the right of B S 2 , then Firm 1's pro…t is higher under decentralized entry than under centralized entry. Provided entry is preferred to non-entry, Firm 1's best choice is determined by the location of the market characteristics in relation to the relevant boundary. This proves Lemma 1.
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 2
This proof proceeds as follows. First, we establish the details of Firm 1's best response function. Second, we solve for all the equilibrium regions and for any region with multiple equilibria, we determine the Pareto optimal equilibrium.
1. When both …rms can enter the foreign market, Firm 2 has three possible choices: no entry, decentralized entry, and centralized entry. We modify our notation to denote Firm 2's choice as follows: "jN", "jD", and "jC". When 12 (xxxiii)
We illustrate Firm 1's best response functions for decentralized and centralized entry in Figures A1 and A2 respectively. Figures A1 and A2 respectively also show the respective infeasible regions above the decentralized cuto¤ m 1 ( jD) where the q G 0; however, the corresponding cuto¤ with centralized entry never binds, i.e., n 1 ( jC) 1. 1. The equilibrium regions determined as follows. Figure A3 depicts these regions; areas with multiple equilibria are shown with a "*". is the most pro…table of the three equilibria, so we opt for the Pareto optimal equilibrium fC; Cg here. 1 Next we consider the non-entry regions. When the market characteristics ( ; F ) lie to the right of B D but to the left of B C and F < g 1 ( jC), the unique Nash equilibrium is fN; N g. When the market characteristics ( ; F ) lie to the right of B D but to the left of B C and F is between g 1 ( jC) and g 1 ( jN ), there are multiple equilibria, as well as several mixed strategies. Of all these equilibria, N N 1 is the most pro…table, 1 This equilibrium re…nement also creates the most conservative possible boundary for our counterintuitive equilibrium, fD; Dg. i so we highlight the Pareto optimal equilibrium fN; N g as being the most probable.
(c) Region III versus Region IV. When the market characteristics ( ; F ) lie to the right of B C and F < m 1 ( jD), if Firm 2 chooses either decentralized or centralized entry, then Firm 1's best response is decentralized entry or no entry. When will entry be preferred? Since f 1 ( jD) < M in[f 1 ( jN ); g 1 ( jN )], for all F > f 1 ( jN ) and F > g 1 ( jN ), entry will be uniquely preferred, and fD; Dg is the unique Nash equilibrium. so we highlight the Pareto optimal equilibrium fN; N g as being the most likely.
Proof of Corollary 1
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 2, point 3.
Sketch of Proof for Competitive Fringe equivalence to the main model
When only Firm 1 can enter the foreign market, the gray marketer's problem is to optimize equation (39) with respect to the choice of q G , which yields q G = p 1 p F . Substituting this q G into Firm 1's and Firm 2's inverse demand functions in the decentralized and centralized organizational structures, respectively, and di¤erentiating with respect to q 1 ; q F ; and q 2 yields identical …rst-order conditions for Firm 1 and Firm 2 as those in Appendix equations (ii) and (xi). The resulting optimal quantity choices and market prices are identical for each organizational structure, respectively. As a result, the optimal entry and organizational structure decisions are also identical.
When both Firm 1 and Firm 2 can enter the foreign market, the gray marketer's problem is to optimize equation (40) with respect to the choice of q G1 and q G2 , which yields q Gi = p i p F i , i = 1; 2. Substituting q G1 and q G2 into Firm 1's and Firm 2's inverse demand functions in the decentralized and centralized organizational structures, respectively, and di¤erentiating with respect to q 1 ; q F 1 ; q 2 ; and q F 2 yields identical …rst-order conditions for Firm 1 and Firm 2 as those in Appendix equations (vii) through (x), and (xiii) through (xvi), respectively. As in the one-…rm case, the resulting optimal quantity choices and market prices are identical for each organizational structure, respectively. As a result, the optimal entry and organizational structure decisions are also identical. j
